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Symmetry and Selectivity: What Happens in
International Law When the World Changes
Paul B. Stephan*
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article has a simple hypothesis: selectivity in international law
increases as international relations become more symmetrical. Conversely,
international law becomes more universal as asymmetry grows. This relationship
holds true during the modern period. Its existence in turn supports the
theoretical claim that the content of international law reflects the rational
interests of those actors that make it.
Consider first international relations. A simple narrative, seriously
incomplete but good enough for present purposes, would go something like this:
from the end of World War II to the collapse of the Soviet empire, a bipolar
superpower competition dominated international relations. There followed a
period of US hegemony, but more recently significant Chinese, European,
Indian and Russian challenges to the United States have complicated that
structure. The details do not matter, nor do the dates, the extent of US
hegemony when it existed, the number of the new great powers, or the precise
relative influence of each. What matters is that the basic structure of
international relations underwent a transformation in the latter part of the
twentieth century and now appears to have changed again.
Next, consider competing trends in claims about international law, one
toward universality and one toward selectivity. Universal international law
applies equally to all states. Selective international law means that states vary in
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Professor and Elizabeth D. and Richard A. Merrill Research Professor,
University of Virginia School of Law. I am indebted to comments and criticism by Daphne
Barak-Erez, Eyal Benvenisti, Gabriella Blum, Curtis Bradley, Pamela Clark, Kristina Daugirdas,
Jack Goldsmith, Allen Lynch, Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Brandy Womack and workshop participants
at the Radzyner School of Law, Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya and the Haifa University School
of Law. Eyal Benvenisti also made available invaluable research on Chinese approaches to
international law and Rajat Rana gave me access to his extensive research on Indian judicial
opinions enforcing international law. Only I am responsible for my errors and misjudgments.
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what rights and obligations they recognize as well as how to allow them to be
enforced. In the extreme case of selectivity, the content of international law and
its enforcement depends entirely on the identity of the state in question. If the
recognition of international law reflects the rational interests of states, then
international law should trend toward universality during times of hegemony and
toward selectivity during periods of multipolar great power competition.
Conversely, if international law does not conform to this pattern, then
something other than the rational interest of states must explain its content.
Much more is going on, of course, but this simple hypothesis suffices to ground
an inquiry into the nature of international law as a creature of, and dependent
on, international relations.
Developments in international law since World War II are consistent with
the claim that selectivity increases as international relations become more
symmetrical. During the superpower rivalry, each side developed distinct rules
for determining what counts as international law. Universalist international
institutions existed but were largely sidelined. With the end of the Cold War
came a flourishing of international institutions and more ambitious efforts to
promote universal norms of international law. At some point during the last
decade these trends have reversed, and epicenters of power have developed new
mechanisms to select which international obligations they will recognize. In
particular, the institutions of the European Community have aggressively
pursued a dualist approach to international law that allows the European Court
of Justice to pick and choose which international obligations it will honor.
The simple hypothesis of this Article has broad implications. Over the last
few decades international relations specialists have debated whether the material
interests of states dictate the form and substance of the international order, or
instead whether constructions of social order based on beliefs and perceptions
shape the interests that produce international structure. For roughly the last
twenty years international lawyers have joined in the debate. As wordsmiths and
constructors of ideas, lawyers have some sympathy with the constructivist
agenda.' But at least a handful of legal academics discount the significance of
As a crude empirical investigation, I ran searches in the Lexis database for US and Canadian law
review articles for the string "constructivist and international w/1 law and international w/l
relations". On December 19, 2008, this search generated 303 results. By contrast, the string
"rational w/1 choice and choice w/1 theory and international w/1 law and international w/1
relations" generated 195 results. This disparity is all the more remarkable if one considers that a
proponent of constructivist approaches to international relations often will contrast this
perspective to rational choice theory. For an effort by a prominent international lawyer to
synthesize the constructivist project with mainstream international relations theory, see Anne-
Marie Slaughter, International Law and International Relations Theory: A Prspectus, in Eyal Benvenisti
and Moshe Hirsch, eds, The Impact of International Law on International Cooperation: Theoretical
Perspectives 32-39 (Cambridge 2004).
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international law as an agent for transforming state preferences and instead trace
the evolution and transformation of international law to changes in tangible state
interests, most importantly, security and material well being.2 The tension
between these two approaches will fuel debates among international lawyers for
the foreseeable future.3
This Article's truncated review of international relations and international
law over the last sixty years illuminates these debates. It isolates symmetry and
asymmetry in international relations, on the one hand, and selectivity and
universality in international law recognition, on the other hand, to demonstrate a
link between the two fields. When the core structures of international relations
change, so do the patterns for creating and recognizing international legal
obligations. A clear link exists between both kinds of changes, and the nature of
the link conforms to what states rationally should want in light of their material
interests.
This Article proceeds in four sections. First, it develops an informal model
of asymmetry in interstate relations that assumes rational state actors and
iterative interactions among these actors. It then expands on the features of
universal and selective international law and explains why conditions of
asymmetry tend to induce states toward universalist claims, and why symmetrical
relations promote selectivity. It reviews the evidence about changes in the
structure of international law since World War II to demonstrate that the
predicted effect exists, and then concludes with an agenda for further research.
II. SYMMETRY AND ASYMMETRY IN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
Think of the relationship of a great power and a small adjoining state, say
the Russian Federation and Georgia or the United States and Cuba. Within
either pair, the states differ greatly in terms of land mass, population, size of the
economy, diversity of natural resources, capability to exert military force,
diplomatic resources, nature of their public civil institutions, and cultural and
ethnic variation within the population. These differences in turn can affect their
relations. The powerful state might use its economic and military power to
2 For recent works by legal scholars in this tradition, consider Andrew T. Guzman, How International
Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory (Oxford 2008); Joel P. Trachtman, The Economic Structure of
International Law (Harvard 2008); Robert E. Scott and Paul B. Stephan, The Limits of Leviathan:
Contract Theory and the Enforcement of International Law (Cambridge 2006); Jack L. Goldsmith and
Eric A. Posner, The Limits of International Law (Oxford 2005); Andrew Eyal Benvenisti, Sharing
Transboundag Resources: International Law and Optimal Resource Use (Cambridge 2002).
3 I do not mean to imply that all international lawyers see the need to link their research to a theory
about international relations. For many, perhaps most, a teleological approach tied to some set of
normative preferences seems to suffice.
Summer 2009
Stephan
Chicago Journal of Internafional Law
impose obligations on the weaker state. In the extreme case, the powerful state
might seize all the weaker state's resources. Less radically, the more powerful
state might demand an uneven distribution of rents from the two states' joint
undertakings.
These aspects of bilateral power relations are well studied.4 Asymmetry,
however, extends into other domains. A fundamental, indeed defining, aspect of
great power status is the existence of multiple significant relationships with other
states. States other than great powers, by contrast, have meaningful relations
with a smaller set of state counterparties. Russia's ties to Cuba and Venezuela
matter, in part because of their secondary effect on the United States, but also
because they provide a template for Russia's relations with other Western
Hemisphere states. Georgia's relationships with Cuba and Venezuela, by
contrast, matter to few.
The point can be generalized. Lawyers attach importance to precedent, the
idea that past actions help to predict future ones. If one can assume that
interested third-party observers derive valuable information from observing the
actions of states, then the relationship between a great power and a small state
creates an asymmetry in the way this information is understood.' A wide
audience will attach meaning to the actions of a great power, and the great
power in turn will take this audience's responses into account when deciding
what to do. The actions of the small power, followed by a reduced audience, will
have less significance and hence, less importance. The small power will
concentrate on the expected reaction of the great power to its contemplated
choices and discount the possibility that other states will react. The small power,
before undertaking any internationally significant action, will ask, 'What will the
great power believe I meant by this?" The great power, contemplating similar
action, instead will ask, "What will the world believe I meant by this?"
To use a concrete example, imagine that a private person seeks to bring a
lawsuit in a US court against a small state's wholly owned enterprise. Today the
question of immunity from suit rests on a statute, but until 1976 the US
government had unreviewable discretion to permit such suits to proceed or not.
After 1952 the government sought to develop a consistent line between
commercial and public activities to justify commercial lawsuits against a state-
owned enterprise. How it applied this distinction and whether to use it at all
4 The outstanding work remains Brandy Womack, China and Vietnam: The Poiiics of Aymmetiy
(Cambridge 2006), especially chapters 4 and 11. I am indebted to Professor Womack for drawing
my attention to asymmetry as a distinct and enduring aspect of international relations.
5 On the assumption that third-party observations motivate and constrain international relations,
see Scott and Stephan, The Limits of Letiathan at 17-20 (cited in note 2).
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rested on discretion, not law. Assuming that pre-1976 law still applied, what
should the US government do with our hypothetical lawsuit?
Presumably, a distinction between commercial and public activities benefits
US interests. Given the relatively lesser role of government ownership in the US
economy, partial relaxation of sovereign immunity increases judicial access for
US businesses with claims against foreign states without exposing the United
States to significantly greater litigation risk either at home or abroad. For a small
state, however, immunity can be essential. It may find litigation in the United
States unaffordable and might have to cease operating in its most lucrative
market if not granted freedom from lawsuits. Because its courts may see very
few claims against foreign states, the small state does not need to develop a
coherent doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity. But the United States cannot
intervene in the lawsuit without considering the impact of its intervention on
similar suits. Even if the defendant state were to offer an extraordinary
concession (for example, surrender of a fugitive not reachable through the
normal extradition process), the United States would hesitate before supporting
the request for immunity.6
Generalizing again, each interaction between the large and small states has
consequences for the large state that do not exist for the small one. The
consequence might be positive: a harsh action against the weak state might signal
the great power's capacity and commitment to advance its interests. Only the
great power can do something pour encourager les autres. The consequence instead
could be negative: a concession to one small state might invite others to press
their demands on the great power. Conceding sovereign immunity in one case
may induce other states to demand similar protection. There may be no
component within the great power's government that enjoys sufficient trust to
exercise the authority to pick and choose among applicants.
In a no-transaction-cost world of Coasean bargaining, the great power and
the small state have some capacity to negotiate around this problem through side
payments.' In my sovereign immunity example, the small state could surrender
to the great power a fugitive that otherwise might escape its grasp. But even
Coasean bargaining will not produce outcomes that always satisfy both parties in
an asymmetrical relationship.
First consider a measure that will generate a negative consequence for the
great power. Disregarding the line between commercial and noncommercial
disputes when invoking foreign sovereign immunity, for example, might harm
the United States by closing its courts to US claimants injured by the commercial
6 The hypothetical is loosely based on Rich v Naviera Vacuba, SA, 295 F2d 24 (4th Cir 1961).
7 See Ronald J. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J L & Econ 1 (1960).
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breaches of foreign companies. The size of this indirect cost might exceed the
positive value of the transaction under consideration, in which case the small
state could not pay the great power enough to go ahead. Even where this
condition does not apply, the small state may face hard budget constraints that
limit its ability to pay compensation. In either case, the great power will refuse to
do something that the small state wants, and which may have only small direct
costs for the great power.
Next, consider the alternative problem of a measure that will generate a
positive consequence for the great power. The US-led move away from the
absolute theory of sovereign immunity, for example, was thought to benefit US
firms with potential commercial claims against foreign states more than it cost
the United States by opening it up to litigation risk. The great power has an
incentive to undertake such a step even if it imposes substantial costs on the
small power (say, a state that cannot afford to litigate in US courts). The small
power might seek to pay the great power not to undertake the measure, but the
same analysis considered above should apply. If the size of the positive
consequence (plus the direct benefit to the great power) is greater than the harm
inflicted on the small state, the small state would be irrational to pay the great
power enough not to act. Even if a rational price existed for the great power's
inaction, a budget constraint might deter the small state from paying it.
Further complicating this relationship are possible information
asymmetries with respect to the consequences facing the great power. The small
state may find it hard to estimate the great power's cost-benefit calculus
regarding the precedential impact of any particular action. It can only guess at
the array of relationships between the great power and other states that an action
might affect. As a result, the small state will have difficulty detecting bluffs by
the great power. A sufficiently iterative relationship between the two states
might ameliorate this obstacle, but changes in regime in either state, if frequent
enough, would diminish the learning value of these iterations.8 Regime stability is
an important, if not necessarily essential, prerequisite for the attainment of great
power status. It is likely, however, that small states change regimes more
frequently than great powers.9 Accordingly, discontinuities in regimes may
reduce the learning value from iteration that an ongoing relationship might
otherwise produce.
These conjectures about asymmetry in international relations have critical
implications for international law. It is conventional to assume that states make
8 On the impact of regime changes on rational choice models of state behavior, see Scott and
Stephan, The Limits of Leviathan at 44, 56-58 (cited in note 2).
9 See Womack, China and Vietnam at 83 (predicting that small states will better coordinate their
interactions with a great power but will change their policies more often) (cited in note 4).
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rational choices and that a state's claims about international law further reflect
this rationality.'0 Rationality refers not to a process of deliberation, but rather to
adaptive fitness. State choices either advance the interests of the state (even if
decisionmakers do not understand how or why), or they do not. In the former
case, decisionmakers will have further opportunities to make more choices; in
the latter, they will not. From this perspective, claims about international law
also should advance state interests or die out.
One might believe that international law, to the extent it functions as a
constraint on state behavior, should wane as state power waxes, and disappear as
a great power approaches absolute hegemony. On reflection, however, it seems
plausible that even a great power may see its interests served by submitting to
legal restraints. Because a large international audience attends its actions, a great
power should contemplate a range of measures that it can adopt or to which it
can adhere regardless of the particular cost-benefit analysis of specific
transactions. Ascribing these measures to legality, rather than to raison d'tat, has
certain advantages. First, a great power might want to make provisions against
an uncertain future when its power faces substantial limits. In such a case, it
would accept a present constraint if that choice increased the likelihood that its
future adversaries might be similarly bound. Whether this occurs in the real
world -is debatable. Second, legal rules lower the transaction costs of
international cooperation, and the benefits of at least some kinds of cooperation
may exceed the cost to the great power of reducing its discretion. For example,
claiming that a measure is legally required, rather than just likely, has signaling
value." It implies that the array of enforcement mechanisms might extend
beyond the conventional mechanisms of retaliation to some kind of third-party
dispute resolution process. Moreover, the claim may change the reputational
stakes associated with the measure by associating compliance and
noncompliance with a more general reputation for honoring legal obligations. 2
Third, states are complex organizations that need legal rules to minimize the
10 For present purposes, put aside the important debates about the precise meaning and operational
significance of rational choice as a model for international decisionmaking. For a discussion of
rational choice models of international relations as well as alternative theories, see Scott and
Stephan, The Limits of Leviathan at 52-56 (cited in note 2).
11 On signaling theory, consider Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Theogy of "Screening" Education, and the
Distribution of Income, 65 Am Econ Rev 283 (1975); Michael Spence, Time and Communication in
Economic and Social Interaction, 87 Q J Econ 651 (1973); George Akerlof, The Market for ' emons":
Quah'&y Uncertain_* and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q J Econ 488 (1970).
12 On reputation as a factor in international relations, see Guzman, How International Law Works at
71-111 (cited in note 2); Rachel Brewster, Unpacking the State's Reputation (SSRN 2008), available
online at <http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1268322#> (visited Apr 17,
2009); Scott and Stephan, The Limits of Leviathan at 17-18 (cited in note 2); George W. Downs and
Michael A. Jones, Reputation, Compliance, and International Law, 31 J Legal Studies S95 (2002).
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transaction costs associated with implementing a coherent course of action. A
great power in particular needs ways of imposing discipline on its various
components. Legalization of its position may help a great power to solve a
domestic coordination problem by forcing its disparate policymakers to focus on
a particular benchmark. It also might constrain future governments of that state,
locking them in to a particular strategy.
13
Consider, for example, a great power that faces no direct military threat but
confronts disruptive guerilla tactics in theaters where it exerts influence. Such a
power would have a strong practical interest in stigmatizing acts of violence by
adversaries who do not operate openly, with a conventional command structure
and in a manner that designates persons who wield force. 14 Beside capturing and
killing these opponents, the great power might characterize their status as that of
unlawful combatants under the international law of armed conflict.' 5 This
characterization would indicate to other states that offering assistance to such
groups invites a range of sanctions, including perhaps armed reprisals, and to
interested individuals that supporting such groups will result in unhappy
consequences. Such a characterization also would enable the great power to
mobilize its legal resources, including its military justice system, to inflict costs
on the designated groups and their supporters. It also would constrain other
branches of the great power's government, such as the clandestine services, that
might otherwise seek to support informal combatants in other theaters where
the great power has not yet extended its influence.
A state's claim that the status of "unlawful combatant" is part of the law of
war may prove beneficial even if it adopts this position unilaterally. 6 The
13 For a discussion as to why a powerful state rationally might choose legalization over discretion,
see Rachel Brewster, Rule-Based Dispute Resolution in International Trade Law, 92 Va L Rev 251
(2006). The political science literature on legalization in international relations touches on some
but not all of these considerations. See Kenneth W. Abbot and Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law
in International Governance, in Judith L. Goldstein et al, eds, LegaliZation and World Politics 37 (MIT
2001).
14 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (1949), art 4(a)(2), 6 UST
3316 (1956) (defining persons entitled to treatment of prisoners of war during international armed
conflicts).
15 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub L No 109-366, § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat 2600, 2601 (enacting
definition of unlawful combatant at 10 USC § 948a(l)(A)). See also Al-Marri v Puctiarelli, 534 F3d
213, 285, 318 (4th Cir 2008) (Williams concurring in part, dissenting in part) (Wilkinson
concurring in part, dissenting in part), vacated and remanded as moot, AI-Mar v Spagone, 129 S Ct
1545 (2009); Hamdi v Rumjreld, 542 US 507, 518 (2004) (plurality opinion) (recognizing status of
unlawful combatant); Exparte Quiin, 317 US 1, 30-31 (1942) (recognizing status of unlawful
combatant).
16 The US position is lonely, if not unique. The Israeli Supreme Court, for example, characterizes as
civilians, and not as combatants, persons who are not part of a militia recognized as such within
the terms of the Geneva Convention. At the same time, that court recognizes the lawfulness of
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assertion that armed attacks by informal groups fall into this category provides
valuable information to interested observers. It also constrains the disparate
actors within the great power's government regardless of the views of other
states. When the United States invokes the international law of war, for example,
it puts into play its military justice system (including military commissions that
are somewhat less formal than a conventional courts martial) as a potential
enforcement mechanism. The emergence of an international consensus would
further benefit the great power by increasing the likelihood that other states will
cooperate with its efforts to suppress informal militias. But such cooperation,
although desired by the great power, is unnecessary for the claim to have value.
To summarize, a great power's extensive relations with multiple states
make it likely that these relations will generate recurrent problems. Further, a
great power has an interest in consistent resolution of such problems. As a
result, a great power has a stronger incentive than other states have to declare
certain resolutions of those problems as obligatory under international law. Such
declarations have value independent of their acceptance as valid by other states.
Characterizing a desired outcome as the product of international law indicates to
other states what the great power's expectations will be, even if other states
dissent. Such a characterization also might allow the great power to solve a
domestic political problem, such as putting into play resources that it has
dedicated specifically to international law enforcement.
One can conclude, then, that articulating and submitting to norms of
international law is not inherently inconsistent with great power status. The issue
becomes one of predicting the form that international law might take. In
particular, it becomes possible to speculate when a great power will join, and
thereby submit to the rules of, an international organization.
Membership in an international organization that imposes obligations on
its members can generate substantial benefits. Such organizations can provide
expertise in specialized areas. Perhaps more importantly, they can coordinate
some uses of force to prevent such civilians from carrying out armed attacks, even though the
international law of armed conflict generally prohibits the deliberate targeting of civilians. See
Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v Government of Israel, HCJ 769/02 (Dec 11, 2005). The
Special Rapporteur for the UN Human Rights Council, a European international law professor,
rejects the concept of unlawful combatant categorically and insists that "there are no
circumstances in which the targeting of any other person [than a combatant directly participating
in hostilities] can be justified." Martin Scheinin, Mission to the United States of America,
A/HRC/6/17/Add.3, 20 (2007), available online at <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/
UNDOC/GEN/GO7/149/55/PDF/GO714955.pdf> (visited Apr 17, 2009). For a defense of
the US view in the face of these objections, see John B. Bellinger III, Unlawful enemy combatants,
excerpted in Sally J. Cummins, ed, Digest of United States Practice in International Law 2007 911, 911-
17 (Oxford 2008).
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responses to particular problems in a manner that reinforces stability while
permitting flexibility in the face of unexpected events.
Because membership in an international organization constrains as well as
empowers, a great power probably will not join without reservations. Instead, a
rational great power should seek to constrain organizations that stray too far
from its purposes. A constraint might take the form of an ex ante restriction on
the organization's capacities, or instead through rules that submit certain key
actions to a vote for which the great power retains a veto." Control over
membership also can limit the organization's capacities. A regional great power,
for example, might join an organization whose members fall within its sphere of
influence, while a universal hegemon might act through an organization
comprising most states. In areas where the interests of great powers coincide,
there might arise an international organization with universal membership but
limited scope. 8
Finally, consider a world with multiple great powers. Each great power
would have numerous asymmetrical relationships with small states but
symmetrical relations with each other. Further, assume that the great powers
have some convergent interests but also have sharp disagreements in some areas.
What would international law look like in such a world?
First, it seems plausible to assume that states with symmetrical relations
and conflicting interests would be less likely to assert that a controversial
measure, not already embodied in a formal legal agreement, rests on
international law. The likelihood of disagreement and the even distribution of
power would make such assertions futile, if not provocative, and to some extent
might undermine similar assertions made in the context of asymmetrical
relations. If, as I argue above, ascribing a preferred outcome to international law
has value to a great power, then obviously empty ascriptions undermine that
value. Cynicism about the meaningfulness of the international law label in one
area may leak into others.
Second, it seems less likely that great powers would surrender to an
international organization authority to resolve questions where they have
opposing interests. As long as a great power would prefer to see an issue
unresolved rather than have it go in an adversary great power's favor, it would
block any mechanism that might lead to resolution by a body in which its
adversary has a voice. It does not seem unreasonable to assume that a significant
range of issues fall into this category. Consider, for example, the "frozen
17 See Paul B. Stephan, Courts, Tribunals and Legal Unifcaion-The Agen-y Problem, 3 Chi J Ind L 333,
335-37 (2002).
18 Consider Daniel W. Drezner, All Politics is Global: Explaining International Regulatory Regimes 63-88
(Princeton 2007).
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conflicts" involving breakaway regions in states that once formed the Soviet
Union.19 Unless and until the great powers agree on a unified solution to all
these conflicts (say, no change in 1989 national boundaries without the consent
of all concerned), deadlock seems preferable (from the perspective of the great
powers, not that of the persons living in the affected regions) to a solution
designed to satisfy no great power.
Third, the existence of competing great powers who are simultaneously
regional hegemons can complicate this analysis. A regional hegemon might
ascribe measures to international law and promote international organizations
even in the face of another great power's opposition, if these steps would
promote regional coherence and solidarity. The value of signaling to states under
its influence the quality of the hegemon's commitment to a measure might
outweigh the costs associated with rejection of the measure by the opposing
coalition. Similarly, international organizations limited to states within the
hegemon's sphere of influence would bring expertise, commitment and
flexibility to bear on a policy area and still remain under the hegemon's ultimate
control. As a result, even under conditions of symmetry we might see the
growth of assertions of international law and international organizations, but on
a regional rather than a universal basis.
To summarize, in a world where states act rationally and where the
expression of international law reflects the choices of such states, great powers
have an incentive to formulate their preferences as claims about international
legal obligation and to delegate responsibility to address particular problems to
international organizations over which they have effective control. Where
multiple great powers coexist in a world of rational actors, we should expect
conflicting claims about the content of international legal obligations and a more
limited scope for international organizations. Claims about international law
might develop universally, regionally, or unilaterally, depending on the
configuration of power relations at any particular moment.
III. UNIVERSALITY AND SELECTIVITY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW
A naive observer of international law might believe that this body of legal
commitments applies coherently and universally. One can find such aspirations
19 These conflicts, which vary in severity, include Transnistria in Moldova, Abkhazia and South
Ossetia in Georgia, Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan, Chechnya in Russia, and Crimea in the
Ukraine. Similar conflicts attended the breakup of Yugoslavia and, in the case of Kosovo,
continue to fester. Consider Christopher J. Borgen, Whose Public, Whose Order? Imperiu, Region, and
Normative Frction, 32 Yale J Ind L 331 (2007); Christopher J. Borgen, Imagining Sovereigny, Managing
Secession: The Legal Geography of Eurasia's ' FroZen Conflicts", 9 Or Rev Intl L 477 (2007).
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throughout the literature.20 As a purely positive matter, however, many different
international rules apply to the many states that make up the international
system. Most obviously, states negotiate and join treaties selectively, with almost
no single international agreement enjoying the formal assent of every state." The
binding nature of a treaty depends on state consent, and universal consent to
identical obligations is exceedingly rare. As a result, although many states may
have some overlapping treaty obligations, few if any states in the contemporary
world face exactly the same set of treaty commitments as any other state, and
certainly no two great powers do.
Moreover, over the last century we have seen the rise of international
organizations with independent lawmaking capability. These bodies, the
creatures of treaties, sometimes take on adjudicatory form, sometimes a
legislative one, and sometimes, as in the case of the European Community,
exercise all the legal functions of a state. The exercise of this delegated authority
adds another layer of complexity to the determination of international law and
invites further selectivity by states in what rules they will recognize.22
A state can deal with an international organization and the law it makes in
several ways. It may simply stay outside the club, thereby withholding its consent
to and support for the entire operation. The refusal of the US to join the
International Criminal Court or ratify the Kyoto Protocol exemplifies such
lawful if controversial selectivity. Alternatively, a state might join a club but
refuse to respect some portion of the rules that the organization generates. A
number of European constitutional courts, for example, have considered the
prospect of rejecting rules generated by the institutions of the European
Community in cases where those rules violate fundamental national law.23
20 See Gabriella Blum, Bilatera:sm, Multilateralism, and the Architecture of International Law, 49 Harv J Ind
L 323, 323-25 (2008).
21 Id at 335-38, 345-46. Even when most or all states join the same treaty, the result may not be
identical legal obligations. For example, almost every state has assented to the UN Charter, but no
consensus exists about precisely what obligations that treaty entails.
22 See Scott and Stephan, The Limits of Leviatban at 43-47 (cited in note 2). Consider Andrew T.
Guzman and Jennifer Landsidle, The Myth of International Delegation, 96 Cal L Rev 1693 (2008);
Curtis A. Bradley and Judith G. Kelley, The Concept of Internaional Delegation, 71 L & Contemp
Probs 1 (2008); Laurence R. Heifer, Nonconsensual International Lawmaking 2008 U Ill L Rev 71;
Kristina Daugirdas, International Delegations and Administrative Law, 66 Md L Rev 707 (2007);
Edward T. Swaine, The Consituionaliy of International Delegations, 104 Colum L Rev 1492 (2004);
Curtis A. Bradley, International Delegations, the Structural Constitution, and Non-Self-Execution, 55 Stan L
Rev 1557 (2003); Stephan, 3 Chi J Ind L 333 (cited in note 17); Julian G. Ku, The Delegation of
Federal Power to International OrganiZations: New Problems with Old Solutions, 85 Minn L Rev 71 (2000).
23 Thoburn v Sunderland Cio Council, [2002] 1 CMLR 50, [2003] QB 151 (UK Q.B.); Conseil d'ttat,
Ass, 30 Oct 1998, Sarran etLevacber, 1998 Lebon 368 (French Conseil d'ttat); Decision of 12 Oct
1993, Re: Maastncbt Treat, BVerfGE 89, [1994] 1 CMELR 57 (1993) (German Constitutional Court);
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Disregard of the decisions of the World Trade Organization's ("WTO")
Appellate Body occurs regularly.24 As I discuss in the next section, just in the last
year the top judicial bodies in both the European Community and the US have
asserted the authority to disregard the authoritative and conclusive orders of
organs of the UN, namely the International Court of Justice ("ICJ") and the
Security Council.
And then there is the thorny problem of customary international law. In
theory, certain rules arising from state practice develop into universally binding
custom, save for those rare states that persist in objecting to the rule. 6 Reality is
much messier. States differ widely in the methods they employ for the
recognition and interpretation of custom. Even when they invoke the same
general principles of recognition and interpretation, they find sufficient leeway
within the loose standards invoked by custom to reach profoundly different
conclusions.
To add another layer of complexity, customary international law includes
the rules of treaty interpretation. Although a multilateral convention on this
subject exists, important powers, most especially the United States, have
declined to join it.2 As a result, not only do different treaties apply to different
states, but differences in views as to the customary rules of treaty interpretation
can lead to diverging legal obligations even when states have a treaty in
common. Moreover, treaty enforcement mechanisms can diverge even when
states recognize the same obligation, altering the practical effect of the shared
rule.28
SpA Fragd v Amministra!jone delle Finan7e, Dec 232 of 21 Apr 1989, 72 RDI 102 (Italian
Constitutional Court).
24 See Marco Bronckers, From 'Direct Effect" to 'Muted Dialogue": Recent Developments in the European
Courts' Case Law on the WITO and Beyond, 11 J Ind Econ L 885 (2008). For the most recent instance
FIAMM v Council, Cases C-120/06, C-121/06, 2008 ECJ (Sep 9, 2008), available online at
<http://curia.europa.eu/en/transitpage.htm> (visited Apr 17, 2009).
25 Medellin v Texas, 128 S Ct 1346 (2008); Kadi & Al Barakaat Intl Found v Council & Comn, Joined
Cases C-402/05, C-415/05, 3 CMLR 41 (2008).
26 See Statute of the International Court of Justice (1945), art 38(I)(b), 59 Stat 1055, TS No 993
(authorizing the court to apply "international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted
as law"); Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 102(2) (1987)
("Third Restatement") ("Customary international law results from a general and consistent
practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.').
27 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), 1155 UN Treaty Ser 331 (1980). The
United States recognizes some, but not all, aspects of this Convention as binding custom.
Consider Maria Frankowska, The Vienna Convenlion on the Law of Treaties Before United States Courts,
28 Va J Intl L 281, 286 (1988). Other nonparties include France, India, Israel, and North Korea,
all of which are declared, or assumed to be, nuclear powers.
28 See Blum, 49 Harv J Intl L at 352-54 (cited in note 20); Paul B. Stephan, Revisiting the Incorporation
Debate: The Role ofDomestic Poitical Structure, 31 Va J Ind L 417, 421-22 (1991).
Summer 2009
StephanSymmetry and Selectivity
Chicago Journal of International Law
These factors allow states a high degree of selectivity in what rules of
international law they will recognize. Consider a cluster of treaties to which most
states belong, the four 1949 Geneva Conventions on international humanitarian
law.29 One might think that the evolution of decades of practice by dozens of
the countries under these Conventions would have led to consensus on most, if
not all, salient issues. But fierce debates still rage. As I indicated above, the US
government takes the position that persons who participate or support armed
attacks but do not belong to regular militias, as defined by the Prisoner of War
Convention, do not enjoy the privileges normally extended to combatants under
the Conventions and the customary law of armed conflict. Others insist that
there is no such thing as an "unlawful combatant" under international law and
that those persons who do not enjoy combatant privilege are simply civilians.
Some of the authorities who adhere to the civilian-only position believe that the
law of war forbids the deliberate targeting of civilians in nearly all circumstances,
but the Israeli Supreme Court disagrees.30
The implications of these disputes are profound. Is it permissible to use
military resources, including the mechanisms of military justice, to deal with
terrorists? Can governments legally kill terrorists to thwart an attack, and if so,
how imminent must the attack be? What legal standards apply to justify the
capture and detention of terrorists? Is the rendering of support to a terrorist
organization a war crime or only a local criminal offense, subject to normal rules
regarding the limits of a state's prescriptive jurisdiction? Working within the
conventional tools and principles of international law, including the customary
law of treaty interpretation, a conscientious adviser can come up with multiple
and conflicting answers to all of these questions.'
29 Geneva Convention () for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field (1949), 6 UST 3114 (1956); Geneva Convention (11) for the
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed
Forces at Sea (1949), 6 UST 3217 (1956); Geneva Convention (11) Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War (1949), 6 UST 3316 (1956); Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection
of Civilian Persons in Time of War (1949), 6 UST 3516 (1956).
30 See authorities cited in notes 14--16.
31 Also noteworthy is the second-order debate between the US government and European legal
academics working under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross over the
proper methodology for establishing rules of customary international law. Compare Jean-Marie
Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customay InternationalHumanitarian Law (Cambridge 2005),
with Letter from John Bellinger III, Legal Adviser, US Dept of State, and Jim Haynes II, General
Counsel, US Dept of Defense, to Dr. Jakob Kellenberger, President, Intl Comm of the Red Cross
(Nov 3, 2006), in Sally J. Cummins, ed, Digest of United States Practice in InternationalLaw 2006 1069-
85 (2007), and W. Hays Parks, The ICRC Customary Law Study: A Preh'minay Assessment, 99 Am
Socy Intl L Proc 208, 208-11 (2005).
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The unlawful combatant example is especially salient, but hardly the only
instance of fundamental disagreement among responsible actors about the
content of international law. Does international law employ a concept of jus
cogens, that is to say a body of rules that apply without regard to state consent?
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties ("VCLT") endorses this
proposition, as does the American Law Institute's Restatement of the Law of
Foreign Relations of the United States. 32 Most academic international law
specialists take the existence of jus cogens as a given, and the European
Community's Court of First Instance expressly endorsed the concept.33 But
adherence to the VCLT is far from universal, and in particular does not include
the United States. Moreover, US courts and the US government seem equivocal
about whether this category of international law exists, as well as what its
content might be.34
To consider another fundamental question, what is the content of the
customary international law governing prescriptive jurisdiction, that is to say the
authority of a state to regulate persons and conduct? Traditionally, territory and
citizenship have served as the bedrock of the authority to prescribe rules.
Collaterally, many states for decades resisted the assertion by the United States
of its right to regulate extraterritorial conduct by noncitizens that has a direct
and intentional effect on persons and things within its territory.35 More recently,
many academics and a few European states seem to have reversed direction by
asserting that universal jurisdiction (which does not require any domestic effect
at all) exists for states to punish certain human rights violations, independent of
any treaty authority.36 The US government appears to disagree with these non-
32 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art 54; Third Restatement § 331(2)(b) & cmt e (1987)
(cited in note 26).
33 Kadi v Council, Case T-315/01, 2005 ECR 11-3649 (Sep 21, 2005) (upholding Council Regulation
No 467/2001, but considering jus cogens attack), reversed, Kadi &AlBarakaat IntlFound v Council
& Comn, Joined Cases C-402/05, C-415/05, 3 CMLR 41 (2008).
34 See, for example, Belhas v Ya'alon, 515 F3d 1279, 1288 (DC Cir 2008) (rejecting implied jus cogens
exception to foreign sovereign immunity); United States v Yousef 327 F3d 56, 94-96 (2d Cir 2003)
(limiting scope of jus cogens claims); Smith v Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahirya, 101 F3d 239,
244 (2d Cir 1996) (rejecting implied waiver of foreign sovereign immunity based on jus cogens
violation); Pnnc! v Federal Repubic of Germany, 26 F3d 1166 (DC Cir 1994) (rejecting implied waiver
of foreign sovereign immunity based on jus cogens violation); Committee of US Citizens v Reagan,
859 F2d 929, 939-42 (DC Cir 1988) (rejecting argument that compliance with ICJ judgments was
jus cogens).
35 See, for example, Brief of Amicus Curiae the European Commission in Support of Neither Party,
Sosa vAlvareZ-Machain, No 03-339 (US Jan 23, 2004). See also Third Restatement § 403 (seeking to
accommodate European objections to US assertion of prescriptive jurisdiction) (cited in note 26).
36 For the view of the advocates, see, for example, Stephen Macedo & Mary Robinson, The Princeton
Prindples on Universal Jurisdiction 23--27 (Princeton 2001).
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treaty claims about universal jurisdiction, although it continues to push the limits
of the effects concept. 37
The point is that disagreement over the content of international law goes
beyond debates about marginal issues that any legal system invites. Rather, as
these examples indicate, no consensus exists about the basic architecture of the
system. In the face of these conflicts, states opportunistically select both the
first-order rules that impose obligations directly and the second-order rules that
address how to select rules.
There is a tendency in international law scholarship to deplore, and to
some extent disregard, selectivity by states in the recognition of international
law.3' These commentators insist that international law can provide only one
answer to any particular question. A practice either complies with international
law or it does not, no matter what level of disagreement about the applicable
rule may exist.39 This disposition is understandable but shortsighted. If
international law is to function as a constraint on state behavior and a means of
ordering social relations, it must submit to the kind of positive analysis that
normally applies in the study of any legal system. When variation exists, scholars
should try to determine why. Its manifestation should not be seen as illegitimate,
any more than the variation in contract law among the many common law
jurisdictions and several US states nullifies the concept of contract law as a
meaningful legal system.
This Article's purpose is neither to condemn nor celebrate the selective
acceptance of international law by various states. Many factors drive states
towards a universalist or a selective approach. As the previous section of this
paper argues, one of those factors, and an important one, is the configuration of
state power in the international system.
3 See, for example, Sarei v Rio Tinto, PLC, 550 F3d 822, 837-40 (9th Cir 2008) (Ikuta, J, dissenting);
Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, American Isu.Zu Motors, Inc v
Ntsebeta, No 07-919, 12-16 (Feb 11, 2008).
38 But see Blum, 49 Harv J Intl L 323 (cited in note 20).
39 A related debate involves the "fragmentation" of international law. Compare International Law
Commission, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arisingfirm the Diversificaion and Expansion
ofInternational Law, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, UN Doc
A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr 13, 2006) (study authored by Professor Martti Koskenniemi seeking to
impose a universalist superstructure), and Eyal Benvenisti and George W. Downs, The Empire's
New Clothes: Political Economyj and the Fragmentation of International Law, 60 Stan L Rev 595, 600-04
(2007) (deploring fragmentation as an impediment to democratic and egalitarian development of
international law), with Tomer Broude, Principles of Normative Integration and the Allocation of
InternaionalAuthoriy: The WITO, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and the Rio Declaration, 6
Loyola U Chi Intl L Rev __ (forthcoming 2009), available online at
<http://papers.ssrn.com/so3/papers.cfm?abstractid= 1249432> (visited Apr 17, 2009) (arguing
that fragmentation is an inevitable product of power relations among international lawmakers and
that defragmentation also implies power politics).
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Put simply, a powerful state will seek to impose its own version of
international law. If the international system contains multiple great powers,
each will offer up a distinct and competing version of the subject. Symmetry in
power promotes selectivity in international law. As a corollary, a single
superpower will provide an exclusive vision, even if its claims face a critical
response and calls for reform. Asymmetry in power promotes universality in
international law. As a refinement, a system encompassing competing regional
superpowers will see a coherent account of international law within each bloc
accompanied by arguments attacking the validity of the opposing bloc's account.
These claims produce testable hypotheses. A necessary consequence of an
increase in the competition among versions of international law is a growth of
selectivity. Conversely, a turn toward universality in international law will
accompany a state's consolidation of power. At the extreme, a single superpower
will promote a single universal vision of international law. One can assess the
extent of selectivity and universality both by examining the assertions of great
powers about international law and by looking at the extent of their membership
in international organizations and willingness to adhere to rules generated by
those organizations.
In the next section this Article examines evidence of the relationship
between great power competition and selectivity in international law. This review
reflects casual empiricism rather than systematic quantitative analysis. Even so,
the support for its hypothesis is fairly strong.
IV. THE EVIDENCE
This Article began with a highly simplistic account of international
relations during the last sixty years: bipolar superpower competition gave way to
US hegemony that in turn has receded as the rise of Russia, China and perhaps
other developing-country great powers complemented Europe's independence
as an international actor. Reality is, of course, messier. The bipolar competition
went through several transformations, and, at the end of the day, waned rather
than collapsed. US hegemony during the 1990s was incomplete and oversold.
The outline of the new system of great power competition that may have
emerged in the twenty-first century is far from clear, and in any event the United
States remains the one essential power.
Yet the arc of the story reflects certain fundamental realities. Shortly after
the end of World War II, the Soviet Union and the United States began a rivalry,
often dangerous and sometimes violent, that pervaded international relations.
This rivalry dictated not only the shape of international institutions, but also core
theories about the content and functions of international law. At the end of the
1980s, the Soviet Union became undone and most of its hegemonic relations,
especially with the states of Central and Eastern Europe, unwound. It seemed by
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1991 that only the United States functioned as a superpower with the capacity to
impose its will on other states. An explosion of new international institution
building occurred, some universal and others regional. At the turn of the
century, new tensions between Europe and the United States manifested
themselves. The armed attack of al Qaeda on the United States and the US-led
invasion of Iraq exposed deep international insecurities and conflicts. During
this time the larger states of the developing world-Brazil, China, India and
Russia-emerged as economic, and potentially geopolitical, powers whose
interests did not necessarily align with those of the United States and whose
capacity to push back had grown. Most recently, a global financial crisis now
augers a major reconfiguration of state power and interests. It is, of course, too
early to predict with any confidence what this reconfiguration will produce. But,
if nothing else, the heady optimism and unchallenged US authority of the 1990s
seem to have ended.
The symmetry-asymmetry structure fits nicely onto these events. For much
of the period between 1945 and 1985, Soviet-US relations reflected (relative)
symmetry at the same time that each superpower enjoyed asymmetrical relations
with the other states in its bloc. The brief era of US dominance exemplifies
general asymmetry, even if observers disagree about the degree and scope of
hegemony. What now is emerging remains contingent and obscure, but the
evidence of growth in symmetrical great power competition seems clear enough.
During these periods, international law has oscillated, and continues to oscillate,
in its universality and selectivity consistently with my hypothesis.
A. INTERNATIONAL LAW DURING THE COLD WAR
Mainstream international law scholars tend to focus on two universalist
moments at the end of World War II, namely the creation of the United Nations
and the institution of the International Military Tribunal to try Nazi war crimes.
But events quickly overtook these heady products of postwar idealism and
marginalized the institutions that they embodied. For most of the next forty
years, selectivity in international law dominated the field.
First, notwithstanding the nods toward universalism at Turtle Bay and
Nuremberg, the development of international organizations during the Cold
War period was highly selective. Prosecution of Japanese war crimes took place
without any significant participation by the erstwhile allies of the United States.40
The Soviet Union, although a signatory to the 1944 Bretton Woods Agreements,
refused to ratify those treaties and thus stayed out of the World Bank and the
40 See Allison Marston Danner, Bgyond the Geneva Conventions: Lessons from the Tokyo Tribunal in
Prosecuting War and Terrorism, 46 VaJ Ind L 83, 85-87 (2005).
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International Monetary Fund ("IMF"). The General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade ("GATT"), signed in 1947, encompassed no states within the Soviet
orbit.4' The North Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO ' ) and the Council of
Europe emerged as clubs of US allies; the Warsaw Pact and Comecon served the
same purpose for the Soviet bloc.42
During this period, those international organizations with near-universal
membership exercised little authority. With the prominent exception of the
Korean War, the UN Security Council took almost no concrete steps regarding
the many armed conflicts of the day. The Soviet Union and China refused to
accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ, and France and the United States
ultimately withdrew their consent. The International Labor Organization
similarly was moribund.43 Such successes in superpower cooperation as took
place-arms control deserves a prominent mention-rested on bilateral
negotiations rather than any international organization.
I do not mean to suggest either that universalist international organizations
did no work during this period or that states did not develop any universalist
international law. The 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty created a regime of
great interest to both superpowers and obtained widespread, although not
universal, membership. The International Telecommunications Union, a
specialized agency of the United Nations created in 1947, functioned
successfully as a means of assigning control over telecommunications
frequencies of international significance. These isolated examples, however, do
not obscure the general pattern of moribund universalist international
organizations and robust selective international organizations.
Selectivity also infused debates about general international law. A sharp
divide existed both as to the content of this body of norms and the methodology
that could ascertain this content. The result was two coherent systems of
international law operating largely at cross purposes and antagonistic to each
other.
At the most fundamental level, authorities in the two superpowers
disagreed about how to determine international law. In the West, the traditional
41 Subsequent to the signing of the General Agreement, several of the original parties, including
Czechoslovakia, China, and Cuba, underwent a regime change and stopped participating in the
system established by the Agreement. Subsequent regime changes brought the Czech Republic,
Slovakia, and the People's Republic of China back into the fold, reconstituted by then as the
World Trade Organization.
42 For discussion of international organizations during this period, see Paul B. Stephan, The New
Internaional Law--Legitimagy, Accountabily, Autboriy, and Freedom in the New Global Order, 70 U Colo
L Rev 1555, 1571-75 (1999).
43 Laurence R. Heifer, Understanding Change in International Organizations: Globalizaion and Innovation in
the ILO, 59 Vand L Rev 649, 690-704 (2006).
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formula of consistent state practice induced by a sense of legal obligation
sufficed, even though disagreement existed about how to apply each of these
terms. Soviet scholars, however, developed a profoundly different approach. 4
Superseding the pre-World War II Soviet position that international law as such
did not exist because revolutionary states had not participated in its formation,
the new line maintained that the principle of peaceful coexistence provided the
foundation for all international relations and the legal rules that maintained this
order. Peaceful coexistence was not a permanent state, but rather the means to
preserve international peace and harmony until the historically inevitable
triumph of global socialism came about. The principle did not prescribe much in
the way of specific rules, but did assign to the socialist camp an indefeasible right
to reject any principle or norm of international law that did not correspond to
the camp's objectives. 45 Armed with this tool, Soviet officials disputed the
meaning of treaties even as they ratified them and categorically rejected
particular customary claims, further deepening the selectivity of the opposing
systems of international law.46
Confronted with Soviet claims over the ownership of international law,
states in the West responded by developing their own specialized systems of
international obligations. 47 Although a variety of alliances emerged during this
period, the most important involved Europe. There, bloc coherence rested first
on the Council of Europe and its human rights agenda, and subsequently on the
European Communities. The European Convention on Human Rights
("ECHR") and the Treaties of Rome provided the foundation for a new system
44 See Nikita S. Khrushchev, On Peaceful Coexistence, 38 Foreign Aff 3 (1959). The most prominent
work synthesizing post-war Soviet views of international law was G. I. Tunkin, ed, Hlpo6AeMI
Me),MyHapoAoro npaBa [Problems of International Law] (IHocrpariHa Airrepa-rypa [Foreign
Literature] 1961).
45 See Paul B. Stephan, The Cold War and Soviet Law, 93 Am Socy Ind L Proc 43, 46-47 (1999); Leon
Lipson, Peaceful Coexistence, 29 L & Contemp Probs 871, 880 (1964).
46 For a discussion of these issues at the end of the Cold War by Soviet and US officials responsible
for legal policy and national security, see Boris M. Klmenko and Paul B. Stephan, eds, International
Law and International Securiy: Mi'taty and Poltical Dimensions: A US-Soviet Dialogue (M.E. Sharpe
1991) (published in the Soviet Union as Mex AyHapoAjsoe ripaBo H mewAyHapoAHa 6e3ornacHocmr
- AHaAor coBe-rcKsx H aMepHIaHcKrx 3KcrIepToB (MewAyHapouA-le oTHomem [International
Relations] 1991)).
47 Building on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization model, the United States brought about other
international organizations based on regional military alliances, including the Central Treaty
Organization and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. These organizations did not survive the
1970s.
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of international law that promoted continental cooperation and development on
an unambiguously selective basis."
Differences between the two systems of general international law involved
matters of substance as well as the rules determining what constitutes a legally
binding custom. As to substance, consider the question of duties owed by a host
country to foreign investors. Since the nineteenth century, capital-exporting
states had insisted that customary international law recognizes an obligation not
to expropriate the property of an alien except for a public purpose, without
discrimination and with prompt, adequate and effective compensation. Capital
importing states, and later the Soviet Union and its allies, rejected this position.
Writing in 1964, the US Supreme Court characterized the question as one that
sharply divided the international community and thus lacked the characteristics
of a judicially enforceable obligations: "It is difficult to imagine the courts of this
country embarking on adjudication in an area which touches more sensitively the
practical and ideological goals of the various members of the community of
nations. 49 Congress in turn endorsed the norm condemning uncompensated
expropriation, demanding that US courts enforce the norm even in the face of
divided international opinion. 0
To summarize, the period of bipolar power politics coincided with weak
universal international organizations, substantial growth of international
organizations within each hegemon's sphere of influence, and no universal
consensus on fundamental issues of customary international law. Across the
superpower divide, recognition of rules of international law was highly selective.
Within each hegemon's camp, something more like universality emerged.
B. INTERNATIONAL LAW DURING THE PAX AMERICANA
At the end of the 1980s, the Soviet bloc broke up and Russia, stripped of
the satellite republics that made up the Soviet Union, descended into political
and economic turmoil. For roughly a decade, the United States seemed to be the
sole superpower, unrivaled in its military and economic power. During this time
one talked of a "Washington consensus" that focused largely on economic
policy but also assumed a universal model for good political governance.
Criticism of liberal democracy and markets as universal institutions never
48 See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950), 213 UN
Treaty Set 221; Convention Relating to Certain Institutions Common to the European
Communities (1957), 298 UN Treaty Set 267.
49 Banco National de Cuba v Sabbatino, 376 US 398, 430 (1964).
50 Foreign Assistance Act, Pub L 88-633, pt III, § 301(d)(4), 78 Stat 1013 (Oct 7, 1967), codified at
22 USC 5 2370(e)(2) (2000).
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disappeared, but their critiques seemed marginal and had no immediate effect on
poicymaking.5'
A turn toward universalism in international law accompanied these events.
This trend had three aspects-a growth in the responsibilities and scope of
international organizations, the proliferation of legal claims about international
human rights as a broad foundation for international relations, and an increased
commitment to economic liberalization. As projections of US values and
interests, each of these trends bolstered the soft hegemony of the United States.
Consider the renewal of international organizations after the end of the
Cold War. For the first time since the founding of the United Nations, the
Security Council, acting with full Permanent Member support, authorized an
armed intervention, specifically to repel Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. 52 The US-led
coalition famously refused to exceed the Security Council's mandate by moving
the fight into Iraq and overthrowing the Iraqi dictator. The former Soviet allies
and the European components of the former Soviet Union, including Russia,
signed on to the ECHR. The Bretton Woods organizations absorbed most of
the members of the former Soviet bloc. The GATT, reconstituted as the WTO
in 1994, also expanded its reach to include most of the former socialist states,
although Russia remained (and still remains) outside the organization.53 The US
Treasury and the IMF worked in tandem to manage economic crises in Mexico
(1994), East Asia (1997) and Russia (1998). 4
Greater recognition of human rights protection as a fundamental function
of international law accompanied these institutional changes. This strand of
international law advocacy has, of course, earlier roots, extending through the
Nuremberg trials back to the campaign against Belgium's atrocities in the
Congo. The incorporation of human rights provisions in the 1975 Helsinki Final
Act brought this topic into the orbit of superpower conflict. In the wake of the
Final Act, the United States and its allies, on the one hand, and the Soviet
Union, on the other, articulated profoundly different conceptions of both the
content of human rights law and the rules for the recognition and enforcement
of these rights.55 During the 1980s, the field emerged in the West as a legacy of
51 For my contemporary skepticism of the prevailing wisdom, see Paul B. Stephan, The Fall-
Understanding the Collapse of the Soviet System, 29 Suffolk U L Rev 17 (1995).
52 Earlier, the Security Council had authorized armed intervention in Korea, but not with Soviet
support. Rather than vetoing the Security Council resolutions, the Soviet Union simply refused to
participate in the proceedings. UN Security Council Res. 82, UN Doc S/RES/82 (1950).
53 See Stephan, 70 U Colo L Rev at 1576-78 (cited in note 42).
54 For discussion and criticism of these interventions, see Joseph E. Stiglitz, GlobaiZation and Its
Discontents 89-166 (W.W. Norton 2002).
55 Consider William Korey, The Promises We Keep: Human R'gbs, the Helsinki Process, and American
Foreign Po/4y (St. Martin's 1993).
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the Carter Administration's effort to reorient US foreign policy and thus as a
mode of critiquing the Reagan Administration's subsequent approach. During
this period many states adopted various human rights treaties sponsored by
agencies of the United Nations, but these instruments did little to affect state
behavior and may even have enabled some repressive regimes to worsen their
conduct.5 6 On balance, the emergence of anything like an international
consensus about the centrality of human rights in international law did not occur
until the bipolar competition ended.
Several factors contributed to the universalization of international human
rights ("IHR") during the early 1990s. First, assertions about IHR became the
basis for an internal critique by the former socialist states of their immediate
past. Second, these assertions also became a basis for the incorporation of these
former states into the European mainstream. The most concrete step in this
process was the nearly automatic assumption by the former members of the
Soviet bloc of the obligations imposed by the ECHR. Third, the end of the
Soviet threat destabilized regimes that had based their legitimacy on either their
adherence to the Soviet model (think of Nicaragua) or their anticommunism
(think of the apartheid rulers of South Africa and the Pinochet junta in Chile). In
each case, the transition opened up opportunities to invoke IHR as a means of
providing legitimacy to the successor regimes.
At least as important for universalization was the clear interest of the
United States in using IHR as a way of providing a normative basis for its
suddenly enormous international influence, complemented by the lack of a clear
interest on the part of China, Europe, Japan or Russia in resisting the United
States' IHR narrative. Europe, with its Convention as part of its constitutional
identity, saw itself as a partner of the United States in the IHR project. Russia, as
noted above, used IHR as a means of stigmatizing its immediate past and thus
defending its new leadership. Japan found itself mired in a prolonged economic
crisis that distracted it from significant international projects, while China quietly
refused to engage on IHR issues while seeking to rehabilitate its image in the
wake of the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident.
One manifestation of the universalization of IHR during the 1990s was its
role in justifying international intervention as a response to various crises. The
1990 Gulf War was the last international conflict to rest on the core international
law principle of inviolability of borders and the corresponding obligation to
punish an invader."7 Henceforth, IHR became the basis for concerted
56 See Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 Yale L J 1935, 1989-2002
(2002).
57 More recently, Russia in August 2008 invoked this principle to justify its expulsion of Georgian
armed forces from South Ossetia. However, neither the United Nations nor some other broad
Summer 2009
Stephanymmelry and Selecftii
Chicago Journal of International Law
international action. Early on, the United Nations supported international efforts
to halt the Yugoslav civil war, and, in the spring of 1993, it created a special
tribunal to prosecute violations of IHR arising from that conflict."8 This
institution was the first universalist international criminal court since
Nuremberg. International intervention in Rwanda, belated as it was, responded
to massive human rights violations and also resulted in the Security Council's
creation of a tribunal to vindicate IHR."9 Operation Uphold Democracy, the US
invasion of Haiti to oust its military dictatorship and to install Jean-Bertrand
Aristide as President, had as its goal the "restoration of democracy" rather than
any traditional security interest.60 In each of these instances, as well as in several
less-well publicized incidents, the universalist organs of the United Nations
supported armed intervention in support of IHR.6
Proponents of IHR responded to this general success with ambitious
claims for even greater influence. On the one hand, they joined IHR to the
customary international law concept of jus cogens to argue that at least "core"
IHR was binding on all states independent of consent and without the possibility
of derogation. On the other hand, they argued that customary international law
now recognized a concept of "universal jurisdiction" that allowed all states to
sanction violations of core IHR without the need to satisfy conventional
jurisdictional requirements such as territoriality or citizenship. Although these
claims met, and continue to meet, resistance, their very assertion indicates the
growth in prestige and influence of IHR during this period.
As noted above, a broad and general commitment to economic liberalism
complemented the expansion of IHR claims. The most obvious manifestation of
this trend was the deepening and extending of the European Community and
the creation of the WTO. The WTO in particular, although it excluded China
and Saudi Arabia for the entire decade and still does not include Russia,
otherwise embraced many of the most important economies. With the Uruguay
Round Agreements of 1994, it moved beyond its traditional task of tariff
discipline to pursue liberalization of trade in services, capital movements, and
configuration of states accepted this assertion. The issue is complex, inasmuch as Georgia
technically exercises sovereignty over the area but also has an obligation not to interfere with the
internationally authorized peacekeeping mission carried out there by Russian forces.
58 Security Council Res No 827, UN Doc S/RES/827 (1993).
59 Security Council Res No 912, UN Doc S/RES/912 (1994); Security Council Res No 955, UN
Doc S/RES/955 (1994).
60 Security Council Res No 940, UN Doc S/RES/940 (1994).
61 See Security Council Res No 1246, UN Doc S/RES/1246 (1999) (establishing UN Mission in
East Timor); Security Council Res No 1181, UN Doc S/RES/1181 (1998) (establishing UN
Observer Mission in Sierra Leone); Security Council Res No 858, UN Doc S/RES/858 (1993)
(establishing UN Observer Mission in Georgia).
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intellectual property protection. Meanwhile, the World Bank and the IMF
increasingly took on the management of developing country economies, for the
most part promoting integration in the global economy, reduction of the public
sector, and transparent financial markets. China and India, two important states
that did not accept the tutelage of the Bretton Woods institutions, still pursued
economic reforms throughout the decade that largely reinforced the liberal
trend. In addition, many developing countries, as well as most of the former
socialist countries, entered into bilateral investment treaties during this period to
signal their commitment to the property rights of foreign investors."
In short, the 1990s' brief flourishing of unopposed US international power
did not amount to either complete US hegemony or a full universalization of
international law. But still, a single superpower did dominate international
relations. As a consequence, to a far greater extent than in the previous decades,
most of the world's states accepted common treaty obligations and basic
conceptions about the structure and content of international law.
C. NEW PATTERNS IN WORLD ORDER AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW
It is not easy to pinpoint when the United States began to lose its soft
hegemony. Some of the most important developments leading to the
contemporary multipolar structure of international relations, especially the
extraordinary economic growth of Brazil, China and India, occurred outside the
realm of conventional power politics. Particularly salient were the 9/11 terrorist
attacks, the moment when US vulnerability impressed itself on popular
consciousness. But signs that US power had come up against hard constraints
appeared even earlier.
One early indicator of trouble was the heavy reliance of the United States,
as well as US debtors, on foreign creditors, especially in East Asia.63 Although
this inflow of capital was seen at the time more as evidence of US productivity
than of profligacy, the present financial crisis puts a new perspective on this
fundamental economic weakness. Another set of indicators were the successful
terrorist attacks on US embassies and military installations, which turned out to
62 See Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties that Hurt Them: Explaining the Populariy of Bilateral
Investment Treaties, 38 Va J Intl L 639, 651-53 (1998).
63 See Niall Ferguson & Moritz Schularick, "Cbimerica" and the GlobalAsset Market Boom, 10 Ind Fin
215, 227-29 (2007). US government debt held by foreign creditors grew sharply in the mid-1990s,
up by 28 percent in 1995 alone, and then rose steadily thereafter. It increased 120 percent from
the end of 1992 to the end of 2000, and 160 percent from the end of 2000 to the end of 2007. See
US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, International Investment Position of the
United States at Year End, available online at <http://www.bea.gov/international/xls/
intinv07_t2.xls> (visited Apr 17, 2009).
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be the onset of al Qaeda's campaign against the United States. Still another
turning point might have been the 1999 Kosovo air war. On the surface this
event seemed a clear manifestation of US supreme power, humbling as it did a
strong Russian ally and producing no immediate consequences for the
destruction of the Chinese embassy. But the US-led campaign also exposed
clearly divergent interests between the United States, on the one hand, and
China and Russia, on the other, and created grievances that would feed later
conflicts.
The Bush Administration came to power manifesting a distinct
indifference to diplomatic niceties. This simmering stew of resistance and
conflict came to a boil after the 9/11 catastrophe. The United States saw itself as
the victim of an unprovoked and barbaric attack. Elsewhere, popular sentiment
seemed to see the attack as barbaric but not wholly unprovoked. In Europe in
particular, many feared that a violent and excessive reaction by the United States
would inflame the Islamic world, especially the Islamic immigrant communities
residing in Europe. The attack on al Qaeda and its supporters in Afghanistan
seemed to confirm these fears. The Bush Administration's subsequent decisions
to detain at Guantanamo unlawful combatants captured in Afghanistan and
elsewhere, to employ military commissions to try these persons for war crimes,
and to "unsign" the Rome Statute, all reinforced the belief that the United States
had overreacted to the terrorist threat."
The 2003 invasion of Iraq laid bare the extent of international resistance to
US hegemony. Many NATO members participated in the invasion, but for the
most part their electorates vehemently protested and in some cases overturned
the governments that had agreed to the US mission. France and Germany loudly
and prominently attacked the invasion; China, India and Russia also withheld
their support. As the successful invasion morphed into a disastrous occupation,
much of the world came to see the United States as not only arrogant but
incompetent and increasingly impotent. Revelations of prisoner abuse in Abu
Ghraib, coupled with exposure of government deliberations on the legality of
torture, rounded out an image of the United States as dangerous, brutal, and
64 As to the detention of suspected unlawful combatants and the prospect of imposing punishment
through military tribunals rather than either courts martial or the regular courts, the resulting
firestorm is notorious and engendered the hostility of much of Europe and the developing world
as well as the Supreme Court. As to the repudiation of the Rome Statute, the US administration
defended the withdrawal of its signature as a necessary step under international law. It wished to
pressure other states to promise not to bring charges against US military personnel deployed in
future peacekeeping operations, and saw this pressure as inconsistent with a treaty signatory's
customary international legal obligation not to take actions inconsistent with the object and
purpose of that treaty. Critics saw these arguments as a futile attempt to conceal a broad
contempt for international law. See, for example, Harold H. Koh, On American Exceptiona'sm, 55
Stan L Rev 1479, 1507 (2003).
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fundamentally weak. The Russian response to Georgia's military actions in South
Ossetia seemed to provide the exclamation point: the United States could not
protect one of its most loyal allies from an armed invasion.
Other grave challenges to US power emerged in the early years of the
twenty-first century. North Korea revealed that it had acquired nuclear weapons,
while India consolidated its status as a nuclear power, and Pakistan went to the
brink of a direct nuclear exchange with India. The coalition assembled to invade
and occupy Iraq crumbled in the face of resistance and, in the case of Spain,
domestic terrorism. The run up of energy prices empowered Russia, which
asserted its influence, among other ways, by threatening European gas supplies.
Also buoyed by a shift in the terms of trade in favor of primary product
exporters, populist governments in Latin America repudiated the Washington
consensus and liberal economic principles more generally. Then, in 2007, came
the financial crisis, the scope and consequences of which are, as of this writing,
unknown. We cannot tell what the future will bring, but the era of the Pax
Americana seems finished.
Generalizing with any degree of confidence about this new period in
international relations is very difficult, other than observing the clear break with
the immediate past. Although considerably weakened, the United States remains
an important power. Whether the new international system will develop into the
kind of great power concert that characterized the latter part of the nineteenth
century and the first decade of the twentieth, or instead a less-stable kind of
international anarchy, remains anyone's guess. To paraphrase Yeats, the new
beast aborning in international structure has not yet revealed itself to us.
For purposes of this Article, however, it suffices to observe that the system
of international relations has changed and that the evident hegemony of the
United States has diminished, even if it has not disappeared. International
relations have become more symmetrical, even if we see nothing like the
symmetry reflected in the strong bipolar system of the Cold War era. It thus
becomes possible to test the claim that with greater symmetry in international
relations comes greater selectivity in international law.
One indicator of the extent of universalism in international law is reliance
on Security Council consensus for armed intervention. The Kosovo air war did
not enjoy Security Council endorsement, requiring proponents of that war to
develop new and controversial theories about the legality of armed intervention.
The United States claimed that NATO endorsement substituted for Security
Council approval, while the United Kingdom articulated the beginnings of a
theory of humanitarian intervention. Neither China nor Russia accepted either
argument. Then, in 2002-03, an even stronger disagreement arose between the
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United Kingdom and the United States, on the one hand, and the other
Permanent Members of the Security Council, on the other, as to the meaning
and purpose of the existing resolutions concerning Iraq. 65 No new resolution
was produced that would explicitly authorize the planned invasion. As a result,
the UN Security Council lost the control over the use of force that it appeared
to enjoy during the first part of the 1990s.66
At the end of the 1990s, there emerged a general trend of multilateral
projects proceeding without the United States. President Clinton, the Senate, or
both, opposed the Kyoto Protocol on global warming, the Rome Statute on the
International Criminal Court, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and the Land
Mine Convention. Some of these multilateral projects reflected a desire to rein in
US power, while others sought simply to redirect US influence to subjects of
lesser interest to Washington.67 Each, however, indicated a rise in selectivity in
international law.
Another contemporaneous skirmish between the United States and the rest
of the world involved the death penalty. The United States, like China, India,
Japan and Russia, retains capital punishment (although Russia has applied a
moratorium). Europe, along with much of Latin America and Africa, disavows
this sanction. In 1998, a Paraguayan national sought to use the ICJ to prevent his
execution by Virginia for murder. The police had not told him at the time of his
arrest that he could contact Paraguay's consulate in the United States to seek
help. This failure to notify violated the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations. The violation, the Paraguayan argued, invalidated his capital sentence.
The ICJ requested that the United States not carry out the sentence while it
considered the matter. The Clinton Administration responded that it had no
legal authority to intervene in the case, notwithstanding the treaty violation, but
it did ask Virginia's Governor to delay the execution. The Supreme Court agreed
with the Clinton Administration that the federal government had no basis to
intervene in the criminal proceedings, and Virginia, ignoring the
Administration's request for a delay, put the Paraguayan to death.6 8 The ICJ then
dropped the case, but an international outcry ensued.69 This episode, and the
65 For a Chinese critique of the US argument, see Hongqiao He and Wensheng Qu, The Illegitimay of
the War against Iraq under InternationalLaw, 3 J Luohe Voc & Tech Coil 68 (2004).
66 See Michael J. Glennon, The UN Security Council in a Unipolar World, 44 Va J Intl L 91, 94-101
(2003). Consider Michael J. Glennon, The Rise and Fall of the U.N. Charter's Use of Force Rules, 27
Hastings Ind & Comp L Rev 497 (2004).
67 See Paul B. Stephan, US Constitutionalism and International Law: What the Mulilateralist Move Leaves
Out, 2J Intl Crim Just 11, 12 (2004).
68 Breard v Greene, 523 US 371, 377-79 (1998).
69 See, for example, Jonathan I. Chamey and W. Michael Reisman, Agora: Breard, 92 Am J Intl L 666
(1998).
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several that followed involving the same treaties and the same underlying issue
of executing aliens, marked a rupture between the United States and the
universalist ICJ.
Other, less publicized events also point to a rise in selectivity in the
international order. The pact through which the United States legitimated India's
acquisition of nuclear weapons represented a fundamental break with the
collective hard line of the legacy nuclear powers against proliferation.7" The
Doha Round of trade negotiations collapsed, and the European Union's effort
to reconstitute itself came to a grinding halt. Several Latin American states
repudiated their treaty obligations to submit investment disputes to binding
arbitration. Each of these steps represented a move away from general
international law obligations.
Another sign of retrenchment of international organizations and a
corresponding reduced commitment to universalism is the failure to devise an
appropriate architecture to deal with the current financial crisis. The problem is
fundamentally international, resting as it does on cross-border sales of interests
in overvalued assets and the resulting insolvency of financial institutions. Local
political interests have led to actions that aggravate the problem. Some
governments, for example, have protected local institutions in a manner that
puts greater pressure on the international financial system. The gap between the
nature of the problem and the structure of the response remains both
remarkable and disturbing.
Claims about background norms of international law provide even stronger
evidence of a rise in selectivity since the late 1990s. Much of the great power
dissensus over treaty interpretation and background norms involves the United
States and Europe, especially regarding IHR and terrorism. Broadly speaking,
European specialists see human rights commitments as a means of disarming a
largely domestic threat, while the United States sees the law of IHR as
unacceptably constraining its actions against a foreign enemy. At a lower level of
abstraction, most European international law specialists regard the ECHR as a
template for the progressive development of customary norms for state
behavior, even as they accept the technical point that this treaty binds only its
signatories. Thus they deplore the refusal of the United States to regard the
general IHR law embraced by the ECHR as applicable to its activities in
Afghanistan and Iraq as well to Guantanamo. Relatedly, they object as well to
the US position on the territorial scope of the International Covenant on Civil
70 See Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006, Pub L
No 109-401, 120 Stat 2726, codified at 22 USC § 8001 et seq (2008).
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and Political Rights, which complements the ECHR.7' In addition, European
specialists reject the US position that the laws of war permit the use of military
tribunals to punish unlawful combatants.72 Ongoing criminal proceedings in
Germany, Italy and Spain-targeted at US intelligence and military officials-
highlight both the size of the divide between the powers and the divergence in
understanding of what international obligations apply. 3
The arguments between the United States and Europe, however, should
not obscure other conflicts involving the other great powers. In 2007, Russia
suspended its participation in the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe.74 It
also has chosen to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia as sovereign states, a
decision only Nicaragua, its one-time dependent, has followed. Symmetrically,
the United States and some of the European states have recognized Kosovo as a
state in the face of vehement Russian objections. As noted above, Chinese
specialists have published vehement attacks on the US approach to the law of
armed intervention. India's courts have developed idiosyncratic interpretations
of various international environmental declarations as a basis for challenging
various development projects, and implicitly as a critique of the Washington
71 Article 1 of the ECHR applies to all persons "within the jurisdiction" of a signatory state. The
House of Lords has interpreted this language as including persons detained by British military
forces in Iraq, but not as embracing Iraqi nationals killed or injured during armed conflict. R v
Secretary of State for Defence, [2007] All ER (D) 106 (HI 2007). See also Markovic v Italy, [2006]
ECtHR 1398/03 (Italy has an obligation under ECHR to consider claims for damages by victims
of NATO bombing in Serbia); Bankovic v Belgium, 2001-XII ECtHR 335, 353 (Convention does
not create substantive rights as to victims of NATO bombing). As for the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, its Article 2(1) binds states with respect to "all individuals within its
territory and subject to its jurisdiction." International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(1966), 999 UN Treaty Ser 171 (emphasis added). At the time of negotiation of this instrument,
the United States insisted on a conjunctive jurisdictional limitation so as not to have the Covenant
apply to its actions as an occupying power in the wake of World War II. Many European
countries, however, regard the "and" as meaning "or" and insist that this interpretation had
ripened into a binding rule by the time the United States joined the Covenant in 1992. Under the
US interpretation, the Covenant does not apply to Guantanamo, unless "its territory" comprises
the unique treaty relationship that applies there; it clearly does not apply to occupation activities in
Afghanistan and Iraq. Under the European interpretation, the Covenant applies in all these
instances.
72 See notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
73 Scott Lyons, German Criminal Complaint Against Donald Rumsfeld and Others, ASIL Insights (Dec 14,
2006), available online at <http://www.asil.org/insights061214.cfm> (visited Apr 17, 2009);
Frederic L. Kirgis, Alleged CIA Kidnapping of Muslim Cleric in Itay, ASIL Insights (July 7, 2005),
available online at <http://www.asil.org/insights050707.cfm> (visited Apr 17, 2009); Adam
Zagorin, Chages Sought Against Rumifeld Over Prison Abuse, Time (Nov 10, 2006), available online at
<http://www.time.com/time/nation/artide/0,8599,1557842,00.html> (visited Apr 17, 2009).
74 See OSCE Chairman Calls for Renewed Efforts to Address CFE Treaty Concerns, The Organization for
Security and Co-operation in Europe (ul 14, 2007), available online at
<http://www.osce.org/item/25608.html> (visited Apr 17, 2009).
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consensus."5 In each case, a major power has made exceptional claims about the
content of international law, moving away from universality.
A particularly vivid instance of the resurgence of selectivity in the
recognition of international law is the refusal of the highest European and US
judicial bodies to give effect to international obligations that interfere with
fundamental elements of the domestic legal order. In each instance, the relevant
executive (the President in the case of the United States, and the Commission in
the case of the European Community) argued that universal international law,
namely the UN Charter, justified certain actions, but the highest court applied an
inconsistent local legal norm instead. In both cases, the judicial decision brought
about a violation of international law. Much as the Soviet Union's theory of
international law insisted on the necessity of a Soviet veto over international law
formation, both of these court systems seem to assume the precedence of local
interests over international obligation.
The US Supreme Court decision, Medellin v Texas, represents the
culmination of a decade of litigation over the domestic effect of a particular
treaty obligation, namely the duty not to execute foreign nationals who had not
been told of their right to contact their home state's consulate in the course of
criminal proceedings instituted against them. 6 Medellin confirmed what the
Court had held a decade earlier: orders of the ICJ have no legal effect in the
United States, even where the United States has accepted the jurisdiction of that
tribunal in a dispute that results in such orders.77
The European decision, Kadi v Council, similarly held that resolutions of the
UN Security Council do not bind the organs of the European Community.78 The
75 See, for example, Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board v Sri C Kenchappa & Ors,
MANU/SC/8159/2006, 43-44. Consider Eyal Benvenisti, Reclaiming Democray: The Strategic
Uses of Foreign and International Law by National Courts, 102 AmJ Intl L 241, 259-62 (2008).
76 128 S Ct 1346 (2008). For discussion of the litigation, see Paul B. Stephan, Open Doors, 13 Lewis &
Clark L Rev 11 (2009); Curtis A. Bradley, Agora: Medellin: Intent, Presumptions, and Non-Serf-Executing
Treaties, 102 Am J Intl L 540 (2008); Carlos Manuel Vizquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The
Supremay Clause and the Judidal Enforcement of Treaties, 122 Harv L Rev 599 (2008).
77 See notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
78 Kadi & Al Barakaat Intl Found v Council &7 Comn, Joined Cases C-402/05, C-415/05, 3 CMLR 41
(2008). In an earlier case, the European Court of Justice ("ECJ") refused to give effect to a
decision of the Law of the Sea Tribunal that supposedly bound Ireland and the United Kingdom,
two members of the Community. Commission v Ireland, Case C-459/03, 2006 ECR 1-4635 (2006).
Subsequently, the ECJ barred national courts from issuing anti-suit injunctions as a means of
enforcing the UN Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.
Alianz SpA v West Tankers Inc, Case C-185/07, 2009 WLR (D) 44 (Feb 10, 2009). Most recently,
the ECJ ruled that bilateral investment treaties into which a number of members have entered are
inconsistent with EC law. Commission vAustria & Sweden, Joined Cases C-205/06, C-249/06, 2009
ECJ (Mar 3, 2009), available online at <http://curia.europa.eu/en/transitpage.htm> (visited Apr
25, 2009). The initial scholarly reaction to Kadi, as well as to the general trend of subordinating
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Security Council resolution in question created a process to freeze funds used to
support international terrorists. 9 The European Court of Justice determined that
this mechanism did not provide adequate process to persons suspected of
supporting international terrorism and therefore could not be implemented by
the European Community. The human rights norms implicit in the treaties
constituting the European Community trumped the Community's obligation to
comply with the UN Charter.
Although Medellin dismays advocates of IHR while Kadi pleases them, as a
structural matter the decisions are identical. Each represents a step away from
universality, as embodied in the UN Charter. In particular, both are inconsistent
with the conventional international law claim that the obligations of the UN
Charter operate as peremptory norms that take precedence over inconsistent
international rules.8" Both regard international law as particular and contingent
rather than as general and binding. Both reserve fundamental issues for local
decisionmakers, rather than trusting the disparate actors who operate within the
UN system. In other words, they manifest confidence in local institutional
arrangements and suspicion of outside structures, even when the latter march
under the flag of universal international legal obligation. Perhaps most
importantly of all, both outcomes represent the considered opinion of the
judiciary, and thus are more entrenched than the positions taken by the
respective executive authorities.
My point is not to assess either decision as wise or pernicious. Rather, both
reflect an emerging international order based on multipolarity. In an earlier time,
divergent interests between the United States and its Western European allies
were dwarfed by the common struggle with the Soviet bloc. Today, Western
Europe has transformed itself into Europe, and significant security and
economic interests divide the erstwhile allies where they once united them. It
should not surprise us to see the lawmakers of the two great powers
safeguarding their prerogatives rather than surrendering the authority to enact
legal norms to bodies that purport to act on behalf of the entire international
community.
treaty obligations to European law, has been positive. See Daniel Halberstam and Eric Stein, The
United Nations, the European Union, and the King of Sweden: Economic Sanctions and Individual RIghts in a
Plural World Order, 46 CMLR 13 (2009); Simon Chesterman, 'I'll Take Manhattan" The International
Rule of Law and the United Nations Secutiy Council, 1 Hague J Rule of Law 67 (2009); P. Takis
Tridimas and Jose A. Gutierrez-Fons, EU Law, International Law and Economic Sanctions Against
Terroism: The Judiciary in Distress? 32 Fordham Int'l LJ 660-730 (2009); Bronckers, 11 J Intl Econ L
885 (cited in note 24).
79 Security Council Res No 1267, UN Doc S/RES/1267 (1999).
80 See Third Restatement § 102 cmt h (cited in note 26).
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V. CONCLUSION
This Article asserts and defends two broad claims. First, changes in the
structure of international relations have a clearly observable effect on
international law. Second, it is distracting to conceive of international law as a
single universal body of rules and principles. To the contrary, selective
acceptance of international law is a fundamental characteristic of the system.
These claims intersect in my simple hypothesis: growth in symmetry in
international relations leads to increased selectivity in international law.
A more granular study of international relations and international law
might indicate both limitations and extensions of my simple hypothesis. In
particular, the evidence I have adduced, while establishing a pattern that is
broadly consistent with a rational-choice theory of international law rule
formation, does not exclude other explanations for particular aspects of
international law. What scholars have before us now is a wonderful (if terrible)
natural experiment regarding international structure and legality. Adepts of the
discipline need to use this opportunity to broaden our understanding of
international law and the work it does, if only to strengthen arguments about the
work that it should do.
Summer 2009
StephanSmmetry and Seleclizioy
CJIL
